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Awarding Interest In Labor
Arbitration Cases
By JAMEs E. YOUNGDAHL*
I. INTRODUCTION
The arbitration of disputes over application of collective
bargaining agreements is a rapidly expanding field of private
law' During 1966, there will be over 10,000 awards issued by
arbitrators for labor-management relationships in the United
States, 2
Growing pains of rapid expansion and sui generis features of
the process have created many challenges of comparison and con-
trast with analogous legal doctrines. It is clear that some principles
of ordinary contract law, for example, cannot be super-imposed
rigidly on collective bargaining agreements.3 But the reluctance
of labor arbitrators to apply other standard legal concepts is
more questionable.
Awards which require the payment of money, usually by an
employer to designated employees, occur in significant propor-
*Member Arkansas, Federal District, Circuit and United States Supreme
Court Bars. A.B. University of Missouri-1947; LL.B. University of Arkansas-
1959. Co-chairman, Federal Labor Standards Committee, Section on Labor
Relations Law (1960 - 1962) of American Bar Association.
'From origins in the nineteenth century, the practice has grown most
rapidly since World War II. Committee on Labor Arbitration Law, Report of
ABA Section of Labor Relations Law 70 (1959).
2 During 1964, about 5,000 cases were processed by the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service and about 4,000 by the American Arbitration Association.
17 FMCS Ann. Rep. 54 (1965); Coulson, Spring Check-up on Labor Arbitration
Procedure, 16 Lab. L.J. 259 (1965). Neither figure includes the cases sub-
mitted through private selection of arbitrators. See, e.q., Alexander, Impartial
Umpireships: The General Motors-UAW Experience, in Arbitration and the Law
108 (1959). It may be estimated that there are over 500 labor-management
contracts in Kentucky which provide for arbitration. See 2 Dept. Lab., Reg. Rep.
Lab. Orgs. 20-25 (1964) (921 Kentucky labor unions file reports with the
Secretary of Labor); 2 Coll. Barg. Neg. & Con. 51:6 (1966) (ninety-six per-
cent of union contracts provide for arbitration).
3 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Committee
on Labor Arbitration and the Law of Collective Bargaining Agreements, Report
of ABA Section of Labor Relations Law 254, 297-320 (1965). Compare Inter-
national Union, United Automobile Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 86 Sup.
Ct. 1107 (1966).
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tions.4 Generally, "in civilized legal systems the element of loss
caused by the passage of time during which the funds have been
wrongfully detained is remedied by the award of interest on the
principal sum which measures the value of the actual loss." Yet,
5 Brief for General Counsel, p. 2, Isis Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
arbitrators traditionally decline to include interest on awards of
money arising out of violation of collective bargaining agree-
ments. The purpose of this article is to examine the rationale for
such tradition.
II. THE POWER TO AWARD INTEREST
The controlling legal delineation for the remedy power of
labor arbitrators is United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise
Wheel Corp." decided by the Supreme Court in 1960. In Enter-
p rise and two companion cases7 the Court instructed inferior
tribunals that in view of the national labor policy favoring arbi-
tration, they were not to substitute their judgment for that of
the arbitrators.8 A conclusion that arbitrators need broad power,
the Court reasoned,
is especially true when it comes to formulating remedies.
There the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide variety of
situations. The draftsmen may never have thought of what
specific remedy should be awarded to meet a particular
contingency.9
The private procedure that is arbitration remains consensual;
the Court warned that an arbitrator "does not sit to dispense his
own brand of industrial justice." But as long as the award "draws
its essence from the collective bargaining agreement," courts may
not refuse enforcement.
4 In the most comprehensive labor arbitration reporting service (to which
this survey principally is confined), 268 labor-management awards are included
in a recent volume. 44 Lab. Arb. (1966). Of these, 86 required payment of
money. Most of the rest involved denial of the employee or union grievance and
others granted relief exclusive of money damages. See also Fleming, Arbitrators
and the Remedy Power, 44 Va. L. Rev. 1199, 1202 (1962).
6 8363 U.S. 593 (1960).
7 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960).
8 For a general summary of the development of federal labor arbitration law,
see Katz, Arbitration-Favored Child of Pre-emption, N.Y.U. 17th Ann. Conf. Lab.
Law 27 (1964).
9 363 U.S. 574, at 597.
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Collective bargaining contracts deal in detail with aspects of
a damage remedy on rare occasions. The current agreement
between General Motors and the Auto Workers specifically limits
back pay to "the amount of wages the employee would other-
wise have earned from his employment with the Corporation,"
less particular deductions. 10 On the other hand, mature relation-
ships in the ladies' garment industry include broad remedy power;
an award, "in addition to granting such damages or other relief
as [the arbitrator] may deem proper, may contain provisions com-
manding or restraining acts and conduct of the parties."'"
Far more typical are contract expressions from which little
of the remedial intent of the parties can be inferred. The usual
arbitrator must create the scope of his award guided only by
language such as the following:
In the event it is necessary to submit a suspension or dis-
charge case to arbitration and the Board of Arbitration finds
that the employee had been suspended or discharged un-justly, the Board of Arbitration shall have the right to
determine the extent to which the employee shall be compen-
sated for time lost.'2
[The] arbitration board shall decide the grievance sub-
mitted to it.... In case the Union thinks a man has been
unjustly discharged the matter may be referred to the
grievance procedure."3
[T]he term "Grievance" means any dispute between the
Company and the Union, or between the Company and any
employee, covered by this Agreement, concerning the effect,
interpretation, application, claim or breach of violation of
this agreement.... Each Board of Arbitration shall deal only
with the matter which occasioned its appointment .... 14
10Fara. 50, contract between General Motors Corporation and International
Union, United Automobile, Aero-space and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (UAW), AFL-CIO, October 5, 1965, applicable nation-wide. 1 Coil. Bar.
Neg. & Con. 20:299 (1966). See also Truck Drivers Local 784 v. Ulry-Talbert
Co., 330 F. 2d 562 (8th Cir. 1964).
H Art. XXVII, contract between Climactic of Clinton, Inc. and International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, May 4, 1964, Clinton, Arkansas.
Most parties enjoin the arbitrator from adding to, subtracting from, or modifying
contract language.
'
2 Para. 99, contract between Kroehler Mfg. Co. and International Wood-
workers of America, AFL-CIO, March 1, 1966, Louisville, Kentucky.
IsArts. VII, XII, contract between Monsanto Company and International
Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, July 16, 1965, El Dorado, Arkansas.
14 Art. 5, contract between Aluminum Foils, Inc. and International As-
sociation of Machinists, AFL-CIO, March 1, 1960, Jackson, Tennessee.
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Excluding those situations in which contract language with-
holds power to award interest, the conclusion that arbitrators
have that authority is well established. A professed "conservative"
in the field of arbitration remedies observes:
So far as power is concerned, it seems to me that the arbitrator
should have the same powers as an equity court in fi'dng
remedies. We are definitely committed to the notion, in dis-
charge cases, that an arbitrator should have the right to order
reinstatement with or without back pay. Apart from this,
the arbitrator ought to be empowered to direct whatever is
necessary, in his judgment, to right the situation. 15
The power to award interest under contracts which command
the arbitrator merely to "compensate the employee," "decide the
grievance," or "deal with the matter" seems clearly within the
broad grant of Enterprise. More difficult is the discretionary or
policy aspect of the problem: 10 should a labor arbitrator grant
interest on monetary awards?
III. REASONS FOR DENYING INTEREST
Awards which deal with the interest question usually do not
demonstrate the flexibility which the Supreme Court attributes
to labor arbitrators.
Prior to 1962, a request for interest was rare. In Isis Plumbing
Co., 17 however, the National Labor Relations Board reversed a
long-standing policy, and began granting interest in cases in
notably receptive to new NLRB theories, have enforced the in-
terest decisions without exception."'
15 Stein, Remedies in Labor Arbitration, in Challenges to Arbitration 39,
.45-46 (1960).
10 The power-policy dichotomy is the usual framework for dicussion of the
scope of arbitral remedies. Wolff, The Power of the Arbitrator to Make Monetary
Awards, in Labor Arbitration-Perspectives and Problems 176, 191 (1964);
Fleming, supra note 4, at 1201.
17 188 NLRB 716 (1962), rev. on other grounds, NLRB v. Isis Plumbing
Co., 322 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1963).
lReserve Supply Co. v. NLRB, 317 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1963); International
Bro. of Operative Potters v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1963); NLRB v.
Globe Products Corp., 322 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1963); Marshfield Steel Co. v.
NLRB, 324 F.2d 333 (8th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co.,
324 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1963); Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720
(6th Cir. 1964). Cf. enforcement statistics generally in 29 NLRB Ann. Rep.
202 (1965) (during fiscal 1964, only fifty-five percent of NLRB orders were
affirmed in full).
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The Isis development stimulated interest demands in arbi-
tration situations. 19 An employee who was discharged for one
kind of forbidden discrimination, the argument runs, is as en-
titled to interest as one discharged for another. Although there
have been occasional recent breaches in the solid front of arbitral
opposition, most requests for interest have been rejected with as
little analysis since Isis as they were before.20
The most common reason given for denying interest is that
it is unusual. In his 1956 decision in Intermountain Operators
League,,2 arbitrator Sanford H. Kadish opined:
The important point is that it is not customary in arbitrations
for the arbitrator to grant interest on claims which he finds
owing .... In view... of the almost unanimous practice on
the part of arbitrators not to grant interest, and the failure of
the parties to authorize the arbitrator to do so here, I would
think it highly inappropriate to do so. 22
This unwillingness to plough new ground is characteristic of
interest rejections. Typically, the "arbitrator finds no persuasive
basis in arbitration practice or precedent to justify the granting
of such a request. '23
The most defensible aspect of this rationale is that if interest is
totally unknown to the parties, its inclusion in an award cannot
"draw its essence" from the contract in the sense of Enterprise.24
In interpreting general language, or even altering surface mean-
ing, arbitrators frequently rely on what they believe must have
been within the contemplation of the parties during negotiations. 25
But i-f centuries of legal practice were not sufficient to bring
the issue to the minds of the negotiators, surely the Isis ramifica-
tions should have been. It is becoming reasonable to conclude
19 Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process, in Labor Arbitration-Perspectives
and Problems 33, 50 (1964) ("And, as one would expect, it was not possible to
seal off Board or court actions to avoid spillover into another area. . . . The
same thing was true of the National Labor Relations Board's ruling adding 6
percent interest to back pay awards.").
20 There is some difculty in surveying the. cases because the editors of the
Bureau of National Affairs reports did not insert a digest reference to interest
until after Isis. 39 Lab. Arb. (1963).
2126 Lab. Arb. 149 (Kadish 1956).
22Id. at 154,
23Hampton Corp., 39 Lab. Arb. 177, 179 (Davis 1962). See also Diamond
Nat'1 Corp., 41 Lab. Arb. 1310 (Koven 1963).24 See Case No. 21, in Stone, Labor Grievances and Decisions 67 (1965).25 E.g., Tri-Cities Newspapers, Inc., 43 Lab. Arb. 570, 572 (Holly 1964).
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that if the parties had wished to avoid interest they would so
specifically have provided in the contract.26 Arbitrators have,
moreover, included other unusual elements of damages in their
awards.27
The leading28 Inter Mountain Operators decision refers to
the failure of the contract or submission agreement expressly to
authorize the arbitrator to grant interest. This argument has
been rejected by tribunals in many other contexts. In Billings v.
United States,2 the Supreme Court found a legislative failure to
mention interest almost irrelevant to a determination of its award.
Many statutory interpretation cases rely on analogy to contract
obligations;30 the same reasoning should be available for con-
tract obligations themselves.
As Enterprise recognized, and as all arbitration practitioners
know well, few remedial aspects expressly are mentioned by the
contracting parties. Reference to back wages themselves often is
omitted, but the propriety of remedying unjust discharge, by
awarding a sum equal to the wage loss, is assumed.31
The fact that interest is not common or not specified by the
contract should not, standing alone, be reason for its denial.
Arbitrators, like the NLRB, have "the right to draw on 'enlighten-
ment gained from experience' in fashioning remedies to undo
the effect of violations" 32 within their jurisdiction.
On at least one occasion an arbitrator rejected an interest
on de minimis grounds.38 Such reasoning cuts both ways. The
28 This is the rule applicable to non-labor arbitration. American Arb. Ass'n,
Lawyer's Arb. Letter No. 18, May 15, 1964.27 E.g., Northland Greyhound Lines, Inc., 23 Lab. Arb. 277 (Levinson
1954) (transportation costs for grievant and her mother); Braniff Airways. Inc.,
31 Lab. Arb. 1018 (Schedler 1958) (costs for personal travel during discharge
period).2 8 Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 238 (rev. ed. 1960).
29232 U.S. 261, 284-88 (1914). See also Rodgers v. United States, 332
U.S. 371 (1947).
30 United States v. United Drill Co., 183 F.2d 998. 999 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
Wilson v. Doebler-Jarvis Div., 358 Mich. 510, 100 N.W.2d 226 (1960). Com-
pare Philadelphia joint Bd. v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 534, 535 (E.D. Pa.
1952) ("D'scussion of the precise nature of interest on money due after breach
of an obligation is unprofitable.").
31 Cox. Reflections on Labor Arbitration. 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1494 (19.59).
32Isis Plumbing Co., supra note 17 at 720. See also International Bro. of Op-
erative Potters v. NLRB, supra note 18; Marshfield Steel Co. v. NLRB, supra
note 18.3 3 Diamond Nat'l Corp., supra note 23 at 1314 (controversies over such
small amounts "could lead only to a further and most undesirable disharmony
(Continued on next page)
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NLRB pointed out in Isis that the "relatively minimal burden ''a4
of the interest militated against any .punitive repugnance in the
remedy. Interest seldom will be an important factor to an employ-
er, as the usual discharge case involves the withholding of a few
hundred dollars for a few months,35 but it may have great im-
portance to an employee and his family who have been without
work and without income for those months.36
Some arbitrators have found procedural problems in the
timing of the interest demand.3 7 Others, even well after Isis, have
denied interest requests without comment.3 8 Rare, at best, has
been an opinion which analyzed the applicability of the Isis
reasoning in an arbitration context.
IV. REASONS FOR AWARDING INTEREST
Interest has been awarded in occasional arbitration cases since
Isis, probably generated more by increased urging of the point by
unions than persuasiveness of the NLRB development. In general,
interest awards are supported by discussion no more extensive
than interest denials.
A late 1962 departure from the tradition occurred in General
Electric Co.39 Arbitrator Elmer R. Hilpert was called upon by the
International Union of Electrical Workers to remedy a discharge
at the Louisville, Kentucky, plant of the employer. The incident
giving rise to the discharge was a fight between two employees
which occurred after working hours and off company premises.
The arbitrator found that it was a "nasty, ugly affair," but that
the employer had discharged the wrong combatant.
The General Electric opinion evidences strong arbitral disap-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
between the parties"). Elements of disharmony seem already present, however,
in the usual reinstatement with back pay order.
34 138 NLRB at 720.3 5 There are exceptions. Needham Packing Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 1101 (Davey
1965) (three and one-half years back pay for 183 employees); Tenneco Oil Co.,
44 Lab. Arb. 1121 (Merrill 1965) ($7.92).
36 See Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLBB, supra note 18; Wilson v. Doehler-
Janis Div., supra note 80, 100 N.W.2d at 229. The opinion in Ariierican Chain
Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 312 (McDermott 1963), notes as a reason for rejecting interest
that back pay already recompenses employees for time they did not'actually
work. But the duty to mitigate damages is increasingly available as an employer
response to back pay claims. Elkouri & Elkouri, op. cit. supra note 28, at 1239.37 Caterpillar Tractor Co., 89 Lab. Arb. 910 (Larkin 1962).
08 American Steamship) Co., 44 Lab. Arb . 530 (Keefe 196.5).
939 LA Arb. 897 (Hilpert 1962).
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proval of the testimony of the fighter who was not discharged, and
of employer representatives who refused to respond to that testi-
mony. Noting that the company witness was caught in in-
consistencies of crucial significance, "the Arbitrator fully expected
the Company Counsel to drop the Company's charge against"
the grievant. The employer did not recede, and, in fact, the
arbitrator was "astonished" to read in the employer's brief a
contention that it was the grievant, not the other employee, whose
testimony was not worthy of belief.
As to remedy, the arbitrator refused to order the discharge of
the other employee or to award back pay to the grievant without
diminution of other earnings. In response to the interest request,
however, the impact of the employer's conduct in the case was
inferentially evident.
The Union's request that [the grievant] receive interest on
each pay period "installment" of his "back pay" award,
computed from the pay day for each such pay period to the
date of his reinstatement, stands on solid ground and is
granted. Interest at the "legal" rate is awarded on amounts
recovered in breach of contract actions, where the amount is
"liquidated," or may be "liquidated," as here, by computa-
tion.40
In another recent decision awarding interest, All States Trailer
4o., -1 the Auto Workers requested reinstatement of an Arkansas
employee discharged for a garnishment. Arbitrator Robert A.
Lefiar reviewed the justification for a rule against garnishments
and the need for its reasonable application. His summary of re-
ported arbitration cases in the area revealed no other decision
which upheld discharge on the basis urged by the employer-a
single garnishment for a $16.96 debt which the employee im-
*mediately removed.
There was evidence in All States of extensive financial damage
to the grievant, "heavily burdened with other expenses due to
illness in his family at the same time." Although the arbitrator
declined to grant the request of the union relief in connection
with other unusual financial losses, his back pay award has been
4039 Lab. Arb. at 906. On the liquidation issue, see In re Paramount
Publix Corp., 85 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1936).4144 Lab. Arb. 104 (Leflar 1965).
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called "a completely stated remedy for management's error"42
and included interest.
Interest at an annual rate of six percent is to be added to the
sum paid, to be calculated from the date that each paycheck
would normally have been issued, on the amount thereof
minus any amount earned by him during the period covered
by the paycheck.43
Neither General Electric nor All States appears to be the
close case more typical of arbitration proceedings. In both,
management showed unusual recalcitrance in the face of clear
evidence or unanimous arbitration precedent. In both, there were
emotional factors which accentuated the "injustice" which the
discharges embodied. In both, the union made several unusual
remedy requests, the remainder of which were rejected. And, it
may be of more than passing significance to note that in both
cases the arbitrators were law professors. 44
Cases awarding interest are not the only indications of in-
creasing flexibility in this remedial aspect. In the 1963 decision in
American Chain Co.,45 for example, arbitrator Thomas J. Mc-
Dermott reasoned:
The demand for payment of interest on the monies due is
one that is only occasionally raised in arbitration cases which
involve damages. It is, however, a demand that can only be
granted under very special circumstances. As an example, if
it can be shown that a Company acted in a very arbitrary
fashion in its handling of a case, so that a logical conclusion
could be drawn that the Company was deliberately trying to
injure the affected employees, an arbitrator might find cause
for inclusion of interest as a part of the damage remedy. In
the instant case, I find no evidence of a lack of good faith.46
This observation seems consistent with the apparent, but unstated,
factors underlying the General Electric-and All States awards.47
42 UAW Arbitration Service News Notes, Vol. I, No. 2, Feb., 1965.
43 44 Lab. Arb. at 107.
44 Of the identifiable arbitrators who have denied interest, most do not
possess law degrees. See, generally, Directory of Arbitrators, Lab. Arb. Rep.
(1946-66). Perhaps the concept ot interest is less of an innovation to an arbi-
trator schooled in legal tradition.45 American Chain Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 312 (McDermott 1963).
46 40 Lab. Arb. at 315.
47 See also Wolff, supra note 16. The historic legal interest obligation probably
is unrelated either to the culpability of the debtor or the need of the creditor.
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V. CONCLUSION
The blend of ordinary legal tradition, Enterprise, Isis, and
continued nonspecificity of collective bargaining language has
produced a minority trend toward flexibility on the issue of
interest on arbitration awards. Such a trend should be en-
couraged.
There is much to oppose automatic inclusion of interest in
these situations. Even unions, the usual beneficiaries of monetary
awards, do not advocate rigidity of this kind any more than
rigidity of rejection.48 In spite of some similarities, there are
factors of law and policy which distinguish labor arbitration from
court, NLRB, or other arbitration proceedings. The flexibility
described by Enterprise is important in a continuing relationship
in which the process of arbitration has value exceeding, at times,
the quantum of relief.49
But, equally, the automatic rejection of interest which domi-
nated earlier arbitration opinions is not responsive to the funda-
ments of the process. When factors such as a timely demand and
unusual employer recalcitrance or unusual employee hardship are
established as the result of a labor contract violation, interest
should be added to other monetary damages.
48 See Feller, Discussio on the Power of Arbitrators to Make Monetary
Awards, in Labor Arbitration-Perspectives and Problems 193, 198 (1964).49 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., supra note 7
at 568.
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